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CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSOCIATION v. SHULTZ:
AN ATTACK ON THE BANK SECRECY ACT
By L. GENE SANFORD*
Introduction
In December, 1969, legislation leading to enactment of the Bank
Secrecy Act was introduced in the House of Representatives.1 Hear-
ings were held in June, 1970, with the final act receiving approval by
Congress and being signed into law by the president the following
October.2 The secretary of the treasury promulgated implementing
regulations on March 31, 1972,3 which became effective July 1, 1972.4
The stated purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act (hereinafter referred
to as the act) is "to require the maintenance of appropriate types of
records . . . where such records have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings."5 The chair-
man of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Rep. Wright Pat-
man, described the act as a means of combating the use of "secret for-
eign bank accounts and foreign financial institutions as part of illegal
schemes by American Citizens and others. . . . "I Assistant Attorney
General Will Wilson speaking in support of the act for the Department
of Justice said:
We are deeply concerned when foreign secrecy laws prevent foreign
bankers from introducing foreign bank documents into evidence.
We are equally concerned when domestic banks and other domestic
* Member, third year class.
1. H.R. 15073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
2. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122
(1970).
3. "Where the Secretary of the Treasury. . . determines that the maintenance of
appropriate types of records and other evidence by insured banks has a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, he shall prescribe
regulations to carry out the purposes of this section." 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b) (1970).
4. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.11-103.51 (1973).
5. "It is the purpose of this section to require the maintenance of appropriate
types of records by insured banks in the United States where such records have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." 12
U.S.C. §§ 1829b(a)(2) (1970).
6. Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 8 (1970).
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financial institutions fail to retain records highly useful to enforce-
ment of the criminal laws-federal, state and local.7
Title I:
In pursuit of its prescribed purpose, Title I of the act authorizes
regulations compelling banks" and other financial institutions9 to main-
tain sufficient records to reconstruct a demand deposit or savings ac-
count and to trace a check deposited in such account through its do-
mestic processing system. These records must contain, in such form as
the secretary of the treasury (hereinafter the secretary) shall require,10
the identity of each person having an account in the United States, 1
the identity of each person having signature authority over that ac-
count,' 2 and a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or
similar instrument drawn on the account.'" In addition, a record of
each check, draft, or similar instrument received by an institution for
deposit or collection together with an identification of the party for
whose account it is to be deposited or collected, must be maintained.' 4
7. Id. 2d Sess., 58.
8. "Each insured bank shall maintain such records and other evidence, in such
form as the Secretary shall require, of the identity of each person having an account
in the United States with the bank and of each individual authorized to sign checks,
make withdrawals, or otherwise act with respect to any such account. The Secretary may
make such exemptions from any requirement otherwise imposed under this subsection
as are consistent with the purposes of this section." 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(c) (1970).
9. The Secretary of the Treasury is given authority to extend or prescribe regula-
tions to any uninsured bank, or any person engaged in the business of check redemption,
issuance of money orders or travelers checks, operating credit card systems or currency
exchanges, or any institution performing similar related or substitute functions. 12
U.S.C. §§ 1953, 1955 (1970).
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. "Each insured bank shall make, to the extent that the regulations of the Secre-
tary so require-
"(1) a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or similar instrument
drawn on it and presented to it for payment. .. ."' 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1) (1970).
The secretary of the treasury has provided for certain exceptions to this require-
ment. The most important being accounts which are expected to have an average of
100 checks per month drawn on them for dividend payments, payroll employee benefits,
insurance claims, or medical benefits. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b)(3) (1973). Pending ap-
peal of California Bankers Association v. Shultz, the secretary also exempted checks of
$100 or less from every account. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34(b)(4) (1973).
14. "Each insured bank shall make, to the extent that the regulations of the Secre-
tary so require-
"(2) a record of each check, draft, or similar instrument received by it for deposit
or collection, together with an identification of the party for whose account it is to be
deposited or collected . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (2) (1970).
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Title ][:
Title II of the act requires banks and other financial institutions
to report directly to the secretary certain domestic and foreign currency
transactions.' 5  Under regulations promulgated by the secretary,16
these reports must identify all parties involved in any domestic currency
transaction in excess of $10,00017 or foreign transaction in excess of
$5,000.18 In addition, private individuals involved in transactions of
15. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121, 1122 (1970).
16. "Before effecting any transaction . . . a financial institution shall verify and
record the identity, and record the account number on its books or the social security
or taxpayer identification number, if any, of a person with whom or for whose account
such transaction is to be effected. Verification of identity for a customer of the finan-
cial institution depositing or withdrawing funds may be by reference to his account or
other number on the books of the institution. Verification of identity in any other case
may be by examination, for example, of a driver's license, passport, alien identification
card, or other appropriate document normally acceptable as a means of identification."
31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (1973).
17. "(a) Each financial institution shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal,
exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial
institution, which involves a transaction in currency of more than $10,000.
"(b) Except as otherwise directed in writing by the Secretary, this section shall not
(1) require reports of transactions with Federal Reserve Banks or Federal Home Loan
Banks; (2) require reports of transactions solely with, or originated by, financial institu-
tions or foreign banks; or (3) require a bank to report transactions with an established
customer maintaining a deposit relationship with the bank, in amounts which the bank
may reasonably conclude do not exceed amounts commensurate with the customary con-
duct of the business, industry or profession of the customer concerned. A report listing
such customers who engage in transactions which are not reported because of the exemp-
tion contained in this paragraph shall be made to the Secretary upon demand therefor
made by him." 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1973).
18. "(a) Each person who physically transports, mails, or ships, or causes to be
physically transported, mailed or shipped, currency or other monetary instruments in an
aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion from the United States to
any place outside the United States, or into the United States from any place outside
the United States, shall make a report thereof. A person is deemed to have caused such
transportation, mailing or shipping when he aids, abets, counsels, commands, procures
or requests it to be done by a financial institution or any other person. A transfer of
funds through normal banking procedures which does not involve the physical transpor-
tation of currency or monetary instruments is not required to be reported by this section.
"(b) Each person who receives in the U.S. currency or other monetary instruments
in an aggregate amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion which have been trans-.
ported, mailed, or shipped to such person from any place outside the United States with
respect to which a report has not been filed under paragraph (a) of this section, whether
or not required to be filed thereunder, shall make a report thereof, stating the amount,
the date of receipt, the form of monetary instruments, and the person from whom re-
ceived.
"(c) This section shall not require reports by (1) a Federal Reserve bank, (2) a
bank, a foreign bank, or a broker or dealer in securities, in respect to currency or other
monetary instruments mailed or shipped through the postal service or by common car-
rier, (3) a commercial bank or trust company organized under the laws of any State'
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these amounts must report comparable information to the secretary.19
District Court Litigation:
Litigation seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent
enforcement of the act and the regulations promulgated by the secre-
tary under authority of the act was instituted in two separate actions
before the district court for the Northern District of California in June,
1972.0 The district court consolidated the two cases"1 and convened
a three-judge court to hear and decide the constitutional issues raised
by the complaints. 22
Plaintiff, California Bankers Association, asserted that Title Is
record-keeping provisions violated (1) due process of its member
banks and (2) the right of privacy of the customers of member banks.
The American Civil Liberties Union, as a depositor in a bank subject
to the record-keeping requirements and as a representative of its
members who are bank customers, attacked Title I on First Amend-
ment grounds as violating rights of free speech and of free association.
or of the United States with respect to overland shipments of currency or monetary in-
struments shipped to or received from an established customer maintaining a deposit re-
lationship with the bank, in amounts which the bank may reasonably conclude do not
exceed amounts commensurate with the customary conduct of the business, industry or
profession of the customer concerned, (4) a person who is not a citizen or resident of
the United States in respect to currency or other monetary instruments mailed or shipped
from abroad to a bank or broker or dealer in securities through the postal service or
by common carrier, (5) a common carrier of passengers in respect to currency or other
monetary instruments in the possession of its passesgers, (6) a common carrier of goods
in respect to shipments of currency or monetary instruments not declared to be such by
the shipper, (7) a travelers' check issuer or its agent in respect to the transportation
of travelers' checks prior to their delivery to selling agents for eventual sale to the pub-
lic, (8) nor by a person engaged as a business in the transportation of currency, mone-
tary instruments and other commercial papers with respect to the transportation of cur-
rency or other monetary instruments overland between established offices of banks or
brokers or dealers in securities and foreign banks.
"(d) This section does not require that more than one report be filed covering a
particular transportation, mailing or shipping of currency or other monetary instruments
with respect to which a complete and truthful report has been filed by a person. How-
ever, no person required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this section to file a report shall
be excused from liability for failure to do so if, in fact, a complete and truthful report
has not been filed." 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1973).
19. Id.
20. Plaintiffs in the first action were the Security National Bank, several bank cus.
tomers and the ACLU. Plaintiff in the second action was the California Bankers As-
sociation.
21. Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
22. This procedure is required by the Judicial Procedure Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, 28 U.S.C. § 2282, whenever "an interlocutory or permanent injunction restrain-
ing the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to
the Constitution of the United States" is sought.
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District Court Decision:
The district court, in its September 11, 1972, decision, upheld the
act's recordkeeping and foreign transaction reporting requirements, but
found the act's domestic reporting requirements unconstitutional and,
with one judge dissenting, issued a preliminary injunction. The
decision does not discuss plaintiffs' objections to the act's record-keep-
ing requirements. The court simply states that they found "no con-
stitutional violation in these record-keeping provisions, as such."23
Appeals were taken by the various plaintiffs.
This note will analyze the appeal taken by the ACLU alleging that
the record-keeping provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act will curtail its
ability to reasonably and effectively maintain the anonymity of its
members and supporters in contravention of its guaranteed First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association.24
The ACLU argued that in complying with the provisions of the
act, the record-keeping institution would be creating a documentation
of its customers' social, financial, and political profile. In addition, as
to the ACLU's own private business account, the required records
would amount to a virtual listing of ACLU members and supporters
who use the regulated institutions to pay membership dues or to send
financial contributions to their organization. Because of the contro-
versial nature of the ACLU and its activities, the ACLU argued that
this listing would cause present members and supporters as well as fu-
ture members and supporters to forego their support due to fear that
the list would fall into -the hands of those who would use the informa-
tion for political retaliation.2 5 -This inhibiting effect upon their mem-
bers and supporters and the subsequent financial loss to -the ACLU
could not, argued the ACLU, pass constitutional muster in view of the
scope and purpose of the act26 and the logical and reasonable alterna-
tives existing -that would not have the same inhibiting consequences.2 7
California Bankers Association v. Shultz
For reasons best known only to the majority, the Supreme Court
in California Bankers Association v. Shultz28 failed to come to grips
23. 347 F. Supp. at 1244.
24. The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. Brief for Appellant, California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 72-1196 at 55-58.
26. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
27. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
28. 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974).
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with the issues presented on appeal by the ACLU. In a 6-3 decision,
the Court found that since the ACLU had not shown proof of any at-
tempt by the government, formal or informal, to compel production of
records containing information relating to their accounts or the accounts
of their members and supporters, their challenge was premature and
there was not a justiciable case or controversy. Without a showing of
a subpoena or summons, stated the majority, there exists no "concrete
fact situation in which competing associational and governmental
interests can be weighed."29
In analyzing the majority decision, this note will comment on the
failure of the Court to handle the very important and relevant constitu-
tional questions presented by the ACLU. In addition, this note will
point out the difficult position of the ACLU and other membership
organizations in their attempts to protect the anonymity of their mem-
bership in light of Shultz.
Organizational Rights Under the First Amendment
Recent Supreme Court decisions establish that an organization
made up of private individuals has standing to protect those individuals
from unwarranted invasions by government of their rights of association
and privacy guaranteed by the First Amendment.3 , In establishing this
principle the Court has recognized that affiliation with controversial
organizations may provoke reprisals from those opposed to the group
and such reprisals or threats of reprisal tend to discourage the exercise
of constitutional privileges.31
The technique of examining bank accounts to investigate political
organizations is, unfortunately, not rare.3 2  A checking account may
29. Id. at 1515.
30. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); United States
v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
31. See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 256 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd per cur-
iam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968), in which the court stated: 'The rationale of those decisions
[supra n.13] is that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the rights of people
to associate together to advocate and promote legitimate, albeit controversial, political,
social, or economic action; that when the objective of the group or the group itself is un-
popular at a given time or place, revelation of the identities of those who have joined
themselves together or have affiliated with the group may provoke reprisals from those
opposed to the group or its objectives; and that the occurrence or apprehension of such
reprisals tends to discourage the exercise of the rights which the Constitution protects."
32. See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark. 1968); United States
Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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well record a citizen's or group's activities, opinions and beliefs, as fully
as transcripts of telephone conversations.3" It has been reported that
the identity of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist was first learned by means
of the examination of Ellsberg's bank checks-an examination that,
according to a pending indictment in the superior court in Los Angeles,
led to subsequent burglary of the psychiatrist's office by former high
government officials.3
An analysis of the act indicates that upon its enactment the
ACLU, along with other membership organizations, faces a dilemma
in protecting the identities of its members and supporters from
disclosure. The act greatly infringes upon the right of associational
privacy previously afforded by the Court8 5 by requiring the recording
of information that identifies members and supporters which will be
in the hands of third parties and not subject to protection by the organi-
zation involved. As a consequence the ACLU will be unable to protect
itself from the revenue loss incurred as its members and supporters,
because of fear of political reprisal, refrain from giving financial sup-
port.
First, although the act sets up formal subpoena requirements to
obtain any records maintained under its provisions, 0 there is no
requirement that the customer be notified of the subpoena by either
the government or the subpoenaed party. Since the subpoenaed insti-
tution would not have a sufficient adversary interest to challenge the
subpoena,37 and since the ACLU cannot force or expect the institu-
tion's uninvolved officials to run the risk of contempt citations and
possible criminal trials,38 it is apparent that the subpoenaed institution
may likely comply without the depositor ever learning of the subpoena
to afford the opportunity for challenge necessary to prevent abuse.
Second, notwithstanding the act's formal subpoena requirement,
a recent study by the ACLU shows that while the majority of the na-
tion's largest banks support the confidentiality of bank records, this
policy may not be enforced on a day-to-day basis at the local level.89
33. See California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1529 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
34. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1973, at 1, 21, col. 2.
35. See notes 37, 38 supra.
36. "No person required to maintain records under this section shall be required
to produce or otherwise disclose the contents of the records except in compliance with
a subpena or summons duly authorized and issued or as may otherwise be required by
law." 31 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1970).
37. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 267 U.S. 576 (1925), aff'g 295 F. 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924).
38. See United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
39. American Banker, May 12, 1972, at 1, cols. 3, 4.
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The study indicates:
[M]any banks voluntarily allow agents of the government-police,
FBI agents, investigators for Congressional committees-to exam-
ine at will the records of individuals and organizational accounts,
without the permission or indeed the knowledge of any of the
people involved.40
Third, it is important to note that the act provides no safeguards
other than the subpoena. There is neither criminal or civil liability if
free access is allowed by the regulated institution or its employees, nor
any specifications as to where or how the records are to be maintained
for security purposes.
Because of these three factors, the records required to be main-
tained by the act will be vulnerable both to present and future process
unknown to its customer. This vulnerability, in conjunction with the
intergovernmental availability of the information provided for in the
act, 41 creates a situation whereby agencies of the government and in-
dividuals hostile to the depositor may gain access to confidential
information.
The standing requirement of the Court dramatizes the dilemma
of the bank customer. In order to gain the Court's attention, the
ACLU was required to obtain information not readily accessible, if
accessible at all.
It cannot reasonably be assumed that all regulated institutions
receiving a government subpoena will notify their customer prior to
complying. To the contrary, a reasonable assumption is that many in-
stitutions will comply immediately without bothering to give notice. As
to those institutions affording free access to customers' account records,
it cannot reasonably be assumed that after violating their customer's
banking privacy, they will notify him or her of their transgressions.
This would be true regardless of the reason free access was provided.
If the involved institution feels pressure from the requesting govern-
ment agency sufficient to provide free access, it is a reasonable assump-
tion that this same pressure will inhibit notifying a customer who might
challenge the governmental agency involved. If access has been pro-
vided for political reasons, then quite certainly the institution's political
40. Id. at 3.
41. "The Secretary may make any information set forth in any report received pur-
suant to this part available to any other department or agency of the United States upon
the request of the head of such department or agency, made in w Titing and stating the
particular information desired, the criminal, tax, or regulatory invcstigation or proceed-
ing in connection with which the information is sought and the official need therefor.
Any information made available under this section to other departments or agencies of
the United States shall be received by them in confidence, and shall not be disclosed
to any person except for official purposes relating to the investigation or proceeding in
cOnnection with which the information is sought." 31 C.F.R. 5 103.43 (1973).
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bias, whatever it might be, would dictate that no notice be given to its
customer.
The majority in Shultz, while recognizing the right of an organiza-
tion to protect its membership from any undue governmentally compel-
led disclosure,42 ironically leaves the ACLU in a catch-can position in
any attempt to do so. Only if the ACLU can catch someone gaining
free access to these records, or show that a subpoena has issued despite
the lack of a notice requirement within the act, will they have a ripe
issue for the Court's attention.
The majority relied on the fact that the line of cases providing
organizational standing to protect membership anonymity43 were all
"litigated after a subpoena or summons had already been served for
the records of the organization, and an action brought by the organiza-
tion to prevent the actual disclosure of the records."44 This, of course,
is factually correct, but using this fact to prevent standing in Shultz
ignores one basic and permeating distinction. In all the cases cited the
records involved were in the hands of the party desiring to protect their
contents. Consequently, that party would obviously know if a sub-
poena or summons had been issued and could take proper action to
protect unwarranted disclosure. Since the information was within the
protective custody of the party in interest the problem of "free access"
was not an issue. These cases do not afford insight into the factual
situation involved in Shultz and are not a sound basis for the Court's
decision.
Perhaps more important than the distinction stated above is the
fact that the underlying proposition of the cases affording organiza-
tional standing dictates a different conclusion in Shultz. They suggest
that access to lists of persons engaged in controversial activities or with
controversial organizations, no matter the reason this access may be
requested, poses a threat to the exercise of freedom of speech and
association.
For example, the Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General,45 while
resting its decision on the narrow ground that to obtain controversial
mail one could not be required to make a special request for each par-
cel, especially noted:
This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent effect,
especially as respects those who have sensitive positions. Their
livelihood may be dependent on a security clearance. Public offi-
cials, like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they
would invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government
42. 94 S. Ct. at 1514.
43. See note 30 supra.
44. 94 S. Ct. at 1515.
45, 381 U.S. 301 (1965),
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says contains the seeds of treason. Apart from them, any addres-
see is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which
federal officials have condemned as "communist political propa-
ganda." 46
The problem concerning the Court in Lamont, and in the other
cited cases, was the existence of a list in the hands of government
officials which could become accessible to those that might misuse the
information. The particular fact that the government was forced into
using a subpoena or summons in order to obtain the information is quite
ironically the protection that is lost by the record-keeping provisions
of the Bank Secrecy Act. That is, with the records being maintained
by a third party, the party in interest has lost the protection of being
aware of all governmental inquiries. It is important to note that if the
records protected in these cases had been maintained by third parties
under similar facts as in Shultz, the concept of organizational protection
would have not been judicially created. Under the rationale in Shultz,
a challenge would not have been successful because the party of inter-
est would not have had proper standing.
The approach taken by the majority does not give proper credence
to the fact that once an institution relinquishes its records the damage
is irreparably done. The anonymity of the ACLU's members and
supporters will be lost, and any action subsequently taken by the Court
cannot repair this damage, even though the necessary proof is somehow
acquired.
In the unique situation where a justiciability requirement will
make it difficult if not impossible for a litigant to obtain a hearing, an
exception is sometimes warranted. Proceeding without regard to its
usual rules of standing is not foreign to the Court when rules of practice
are outweighed by the need to protect fundamental rights. 47  In this
circumstance unfairness can easily occur and yet be so easily concealed
that no scrutiny by the ACLU will uncover it.
Standing Generally
Standing has been viewed traditionally as an element of justicia-
bility. As stated by Justice Douglas in Data Processing Service Organi-
46. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (party being sued for breach of
a covenant forbidding use and occupancy of real estate to non-Caucasians allowed to
assert constitutional equal protection rights of non-Caucasians); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (school allowed to assert the Constitutional rights of the par-
ents of school children in defense of the school's property rights). See also United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S.
407 1942); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915).
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zations, Inc. v. Camp, "the question of standing. is to be considered
in the framework of Article I which restricts judicial power to 'cases'
and 'controversies.' "4 The role of standing has been generally per-
ceived as assuring adverseness in a "case" or "controversy". In Flast
v. Cohen, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
[I]n terms of Article M limitations on federal court jurisdiction,
the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be ajudicated will be presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. 49
In Baker v. Carr,50 the Supreme Court stated the most basic rule
of standing. The Court held that a party must have "such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
tions."51
There Is a Case in Controversy
The facts in Shultz support the contention that the ACLU and
governmental interests are in opposition and that a concrete factual sit-
uation does exist for the Court's determination. The issue is whether
the government through legislation has the power to require record-
keeping for the purpose of potential criminal investigation, when the
very act of keeping records will have an inhibiting effect on First
Amendment guarantees,5- and when reasonable and less far-reaching
alternatives exist. 53
The ACLU is fully prepared to argue the merits of the case and
has "such a personal stake" in the outcome as to guarantee sound con-
stitutional process. The consequences to the ACLU of not using all
the skills at their disposal to present their position will be the accumula-
tion of records which will lead to disclosure of the identities of their
members and supporters. To a controversial organization the effect
of this loss of anonymity is obvious. Moreover, to dwell on the thought
that the ACLU would not adequately sharpen the issues would be po-
litically naive.
The majority, adding support to their position, stated that without
a subpoena or summons the allegations made by the ACLU were more
remote54 than those alleged in the case of Laird v. Tatum.55
48. 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
49. 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51. Id. at 204.
52. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
53. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
54. 94 S. Ct. at 1515.
55. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
Winter 1975]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Laird v. Tatum
In Tatum, the plaintiffs alleged that army surveillance of lawful
and peaceful civilian demonstrations chilled the exercise of their First
Amendment rights. The surveillance system under attack gathered in-
formation about protest activities principally from news media, publica-
tions in general circulation, and army intelligence officers who attended
public meetings and wrote reports describing the meeting, the identity
of sponsoring organizations and speakers, the attendance and whether
any disorders occurred. The information was compiled at headquar-
ters, disseminated at army posts throughout the country and stored in
a computer bank.
In making its finding the Court in Tatum specifically acknowl-
edged prior Supreme Court cases, which "fully recognized that govern-
mental action may be subject to constitutional challenge even though
it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights."5 However, the Court went on to hold that plaintiffs' allegation
of a "subjective chill" did not meet the test of a "specific present ob-
jective harm or a threat of specific future harm' 5 7 requisite to the invo-
cation of 'the jurisdiction of a federal court. The Court thus held that
on the record plaintiffs did not present a case and controversy for judi-
cial resolution.
Comparing the harm alleged in Tatum to that alleged in Shultz
is an improper analogy for several reasons.
First, the information obtained by the army in Tatum applies to
particular individuals involved in protest demonstrations. The majority
was careful to point out that the "principal sources of information
were the news media and publications in general circulation."58 By
being involved in public demonstrations the plaintiff has at least placed
himself in a position whereby some police (army) activity being
focused upon him can plausibly be argued as necessary.
However, in Shultz, the overwhelming majority of the persons
affected are ordinary citizens engaging in everyday economic activity
which is greatly facilitated by the use of banking institutions. The in-
formation is private, and of the type consistently recognized by the
American courts as not open to disclosure without the customers'
express permission." In addition, instead of recording the public
56. Id. at 12, 13.
57. Id. at 13, 14.
58. Id. at 6.
59. See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'1 Bank, 83 Ida. 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961);
United States v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile, 67 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ala. 1946); Zimmer.
man v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). In the Peterson case for example, the court
said:
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activities of one individual, or one group of individuals, the government
is recording the private beliefs, politics, associations and cultural con-
cerns of all Americans.
There would be a proper analogy between Tatum and Shultz if
Congress had passed a law calling for the army to begin surveillance
on all 211,000,000 Americans because a few were involved in
demonstrations. If this had been the case in Tatum it is hardly con-
ceivable that the army's activities would have been considered as
presenting too remote a harm for the Court's attention. 60 In Shultz,
however, this is the case. All Americans, through forced record-keep-
ing, are having their private lives recorded because in a few cases such
records may have "a high degree of usefulness" in investigations for
possible illegal behavior.61
Second, there is a basic distinction in the scope of the challenge
made in Tatum to that made in Shultz.
In Tatum, the Court was primarily concerned with the federal
courts becoming "monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action."6°2 In expressing their concern the majority stated:
Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking
is a broad-scale investigation, conducted by themselves as private
parties armed with the subpoena power of a federal district court
and the power of cross-examination, to probe into the Army's intel-
ligence-gathering activities, with the district court determining at
the conclusion of that investigation the extent to which those activi-
ties may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission.63
The Court made a threshold determination that the army was not
functioning outside the scope of its constitutional powers in maintaining
the controverted surveillance while acting as a domestic police force.
Based on this determination, the Court was unwilling to become
involved in every executive decision made in carrying out this function.
In Shultz, the issue is not whether sound executive decisions have
been made within the scope of proper constitutional powers, "but
"It is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself at liberty to dis-
close the intimate details of its depositors' accounts. Inviolate secrecy is one of the in-
herent and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers or
depositors....
"It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no in-
formation may be disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning the customer's or
depositor's account, and that, unless authorized by law or by the customer or depositor,
the bank must be held liable for breach of the implied contract." 83 Ida. at 588, 367
P.2d at 290.
60. 408 U.S. at 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. See note 5 supra.
62. 408 U.S. at 15.
63. Id. at 14.
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instead to the Act's asserted violation of specific constitutional prohibi-
tions.110 4
By viewing the harm alleged in Tatum out of context it may
plausibly appear to support the holding of the majority in Shultz.
However, it is important to note the method used by the Court in
Tatum in reaching its decision. Although voiced in terms of standing,
the Court arrived at its decision only after a full analysis of the merits
of the case was made. The factors considered by the Court in making
its decision were (1) the necessity of the government action involved,
(2) the remoteness of the harm alleged, (3) the proof, or lack of proof,
of a history of government activity that would support the fear of harm
alleged, and (4) any future protections existing for the plaintiffs in case
the alleged harm became a reality.
Quoting from the court of appeals decision, the majority in Tatum
agreed:
In performing this type function the Army is essentially a police
force or the back-up of a local police force. To quell disturbances
. . . the Army needs the same tools and, most importantly, the
same information to which local police forces have access. 5
The Court found that the army was functioning within its prescribed
powers, that they were necessary to quell domestic disturbances, and
that information of the type typically obtained by a police department
was necessary to carry out their function.
After making this determination the Court turned to the nature
of the harm alleged. The harm alleged by plaintiffs in oral argument
was:
in some future civil disorder of some kind, the Army is going
to come in . . . and go rounding up people and putting them in
military prisons somewhere. °6
In reply to this allegation of harm, the Court emphasized the fact
that a writ of habeas corpus would afford protection to plaintiffs in this
situation. The Court then went on to point out the fact that plaintiffs
could not point to any past or present conduct of the army which
warranted the fear alleged.
In Shultz, standing is handled as a threshold question without an
analysis of the merits of the case. Had the Court made the same type
of analysis as was made in Tatum they would have been offered proof
that (1) the act is overbroad with respect to its stated purpose,"T (2)
the plaintiffs are afforded no other adequate protection at law,08 and
64. 94 S. Ct. at 1502.
65. 408 U.S. at 5.
66. 408 U.S. at 8, 9 n.5.
67. See text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
68. See text accompanying notes 35-47 supra.
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(3) 'the history of political retaliation, and attempted political retalia-
tion, against the ACLU and other membership organizations by
government officials and private citizens is a documented fact and not
too remote when considered in the light of (1) and (2) above. 9
First Amendment rights of free speech and association are funda-
mental and "need breathing space to survive. '7 0  "Freedoms such as
these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but
also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference."'"
And as declared in NAACP v. Alabama, "It is hardly a novel percep-
tion that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
advocacy may constitute [an] . .. effective . . . restraint on freedom
of association .... "72
Congress is expressly restrained within the ambit of the First
Amendment 3 from abridging freedom of speech and association. This
has been held to include inhibitions as well as prohibitions against the
exercise of First Amendment rights.74 As the Court said in Boyd v.
United States:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy,
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. 75
"In the area of First Amendment freedoms, government has the
duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are
adequate for the purpose.176
By requiring banks to monitor every bank account, the secretary
has determined that the banking records of every citizen have "a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
69. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
70. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
71. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
72. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
73. See note 24 supra.
74. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
75. 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
76. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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proceedings.'U This, of course, is nonsense-unless one assumes
every citizen is a crook.78
Even more unreasonable is the assumed relationship between the
mass of material required by the act and its basic purpose, the appre-
hension and conviction of criminals. 79
Statistics Are In Order
First, available data indicates that as of June 30, 1972, there were
200,700,515 bank accounts in the United States. 0
Next, consider two crimes in which the use of cash or its
equivalent is intrinsic: gambling and drig abuse. According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation there were 78,600 and 527,400 arrests
for these crimes, respectively, in the United States in 1972.11
Assuming that all violations of these two crimes would be
indicated by bank records, less than .03% of the bank accounts in the
United States would contain pertinent information. Even if the esti-
mated number of arrests is doubled under the assumption that the Act
will reveal otherwise undetected crimes, less than .06% of the over two
hundred million bank accounts would be involved.
Consider also, that if we take the total number of arrests in 1972
for all crimes (8,712,400),82 including those that have little or nothing
to do with banks and bank accounts, such as arson, rape and homicide,
the records relating to less than 4.4% of the American bank accounts
would be useful.
There is then a gross disparity between the objectives of the act
and its record-keeping requirements.
Finally, the objectives of the Bank Secrecy Act could be met by
any number of alternate means. These might include a requirement
that individuals retain certain bank records, that record-keeping be
limited to certain defined types of accounts, that it be limited to certain
defined transactions, or that "reasonable cause?' would have to be
demonstrated to a neutral magistrate and a warrant issued before the
transactions of an account could be recorded. There are numerous
alternatives to the gluttonous recording of all 200 million American
bank accounts. Even assuming.the government's interest is legitimate
and substantial, it "cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
77. See note 3 supra.
78. 94 S. Ct. at 1529 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79. See note 5 supra.
80. FDIC, SUMMARY OF AccotrNTs AND DEPosrrs IN ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS,
June 30, 1972 (National Summary), at 18 (1972).
81. FBI, UNIFORM CRImE REPORTS FOR HFi UNrrED STATES, at 119 (1972).
82. Id.
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fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."8' 3
When, as in this case, the claim is made that particular legislation
infringes substantially upon First Amendment rights, the courts are
called upon to, and must, determine the permissibility of the challenged
action. As stated by the Court in Schneider v. State:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls
upon the courts -to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the sub-
stantiality of the reasons advaneed in support of the regulation of
the free enjoyment of the rights. s8
The ACLU contended that the present existence of this system
of gathering and distributing information constitutes an impermissible
burden which exercises an inhibiting effect on its members' full expres-
sion of First Amendment rights of free speech and association. The
effect then is a present inhibition of lawful behavior and of First
Amendment rights. The issue can be considered justiciable at this
time because the evil alleged in the system is overbreadth, i.e., the
collection of information not reasonably relevant to "criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings",85 and because there is no in-
dication that a better opportunity will later arise to test the constitu-
tionality of the Act.8 6
Conclusion
Within recent years standing has come under attack by many
writers questioning whether it is a constitutional requirement or simply
a rule of self-restraint.8 7  They argue that "personal stake" is not a
necessary prerequisite to the constitutional requirement of "case or
controversy" since adverseness may exist when the plaintiff has no per-
83. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
84. 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
85. See text accompanying note 77-84 supra.
86. See text accompanying note 36-47 supra.
87. E.g., Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Re-
quirement?, 78 YALE L.E. 816 (1969). Courts have also raised this question. In Flast
v. Cohen, Chief Justice Warren viewed the confusion over standing as having stemmed
from commentators' attempts to determine whether the rule of standing pronounced in
Frothingham v. Mellon established "a constitutional bar to taxpayer suits or whether the
Court was simply imposing a rule of self-restraint which was not constitutionally com-
pelled." 392 U.S. 83, 92. Warren observed in a footnote that "[the prevailing view
of the commentators is that Frothingham announced only a nonconstitutional rule of
self-restraint." Id. at 92 n.6.
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sonal stake."" While the citadel is under attack, Shultz is a strong in-
dication that at least for the present, the Supreme Court is not heeding
the challenge. However, decisions like Shultz, where formality is
allowed to win over substance, will certainly add fuel to the fire of dis-
content.
The use of mass information-gathering systems and its effect
upon individual constitutional liberties are of growing concern, and will
continue to spawn litigation. The issue is ripe. The Court's present
refusal to deal with the problem will only make what future relief it
may afford less effective, as what is being recorded in the present will
not be erased by judicial relief in the future.
The interests here at stake are of significant magnitude, and neither
their resolution nor impact is limited to, or dependent upon, the
particular parties here involved. Freedom and viable government
are both, for this purpose, indivisible concepts; whatever affects the
Tights of the parties here, affects all.89
88. Professor Jaffe has made the clearest exposition of this argument by asking
"whether it is a necessary element of a case that there be a plaintiff who proffers for
judicial determination a question concerning his own legal status." Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA.
L. Ruv. 1033 (1968). See also Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HAv. L. REV. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That:
A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VANI. L. REv. 479 (1972). Professors Jaffe and Scott both
argue that the costs of litigation serve to ensure that plaintiffs will pursue litigation with
the proper zeal. Scott concludes that "[tihe idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante
who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal literature, not the courtroom."
Scott, supra at 674.
89. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545-46
(1963).
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